Ukrainian drones against the Russian defense industry. Why is it so difficult for drones to destroy weapons production?

For the past 2.5 years, Ukrainian long-range drones have been striking Russian warehouses, radar positions with expensive equipment, and "disabling" airports, which forces the enemy to delay air defenses, invest resources in protecting facilities, and suffer financial losses. Ultimately, this also has a certain psychological effect, as the enemy feels the war on its own territory.

But especially noticeable were the strikes on Russian energy infrastructure in response to its terror with Shaheds and missiles. Throughout 2023 and early 2024, Ukrainian drones methodically struck energy facilities, demonstrating the ability to knock out part of Russia's oil refining and undermining Ukraine's negotiating position ahead of the "energy truce" in the spring of 2025, which is still barely underway.

The "mutual" pause in energy strikes has shifted the focus of long-range strikes to military-industrial targets. But are strikes on the defense complex as effective as strikes on oil refining?

Much better protected Russian defense-industrial facilities are already changing the rules of the game. To "knock them out" you need to hit further, more precisely and more effectively. The complex structure of the new targets complicates the task. Damaging something does not mean disabling it.

Why has it become much more difficult to carry out effective strikes on Russian targets and what technological solutions is Ukraine looking for?

From oil refineries to military plants

In this article, we will consider only those strikes that were carried out by long-range UAVs, namely those documented in open sources, visually confirmed as successful (when the drone actually hit the target), and carried out by purely Ukrainian drones, not ballistic or cruise missiles.

Confirmation of successful hits is done through geolocation of public videos and satellite images. OSINT analysts "Kyberboroshno", "Garbuz" and others collect videos from social networks, determine the coordinates of the object through triangulation by characteristic landmarks (buildings, terrain, road network, etc.). They also pay attention to official statements, which they compare with their own satellite photos.

Comparing archival and current satellite images of different resolutions allows us to identify traces of fires and damage (destroyed roofs, burned hangars, etc.). Additionally, military blogger posts, Telegram channels, and open databases are analyzed – all of this together provides a relatively high level of confidence in each documented case.

At the same time, not every strike can be confirmed, either due to a lack of video, bad weather and the inability to take satellite photos, or simply due to the secrecy of the operation. Therefore, the analysis does not necessarily cover all the strikes that were carried out against the Russians.

From January 1 to March 19, 2025, Ukraine actively attacked the rear energy infrastructure of the Russian Federation, which culminated in the last clear confirmed damage to an energy facility - the Kavkazskaya NPP.

A total of 32 successful attacks were recorded, of which:

• Energy facilities – 24
• Defense industry/defense industry – 7
• Military infrastructure (airfields, warehouses, military units) – 1

This period lasted 78 days, or approximately 11.1 weeks, giving an average frequency of 2.9 successful lesions per week.

In the second period – from March 20 to June 30 – the dynamics changed. The total number of confirmed successful strikes was 24, but with a completely different distribution:

• Defense industry/defense industry – 19
• Military infrastructure – 5
• Energy facilities – 0

The energy sector is disappearing from the map of strikes. Instead, the focus is shifting to the production infrastructure of the defense industry: factories producing ammunition, explosives, electronics, fiber optics, and elements for artillery and missile technology.

This period lasts 103 days (≈14.7 weeks), so the average stroke frequency has decreased to 2.33 per week.

In other words, the decline in the number of confirmed attacks is noticeable, but it is within the margin of error – from 2.9 to 2.33 attacks per week. Another question is how much real damage these attacks cause.

Why is it so difficult to destroy a military factory?

It should be noted that expectations from Ukrainian strikes have changed over the years. At the beginning, success was the mere fact that a drone was able to fly past Russian air defenses, fly into the rear, and cause a certain psychological effect. Later, success was considered when individual UAVs hit individual targets.

Now, the flights of dozens of Ukrainian drones deep in the Russian rear and the destroyed oil depot will no longer surprise anyone. Everyone expects systematic daily results that lead to production shutdowns, fires, detonations, etc.

This evolution in expectations for long-range strikes is entirely reasonable, but it significantly raises the bar of difficulty.

In the case of refineries, such critical and systemic consequences are easier to achieve. The architecture of these facilities is open, tightly connected with technological chains operating under high pressure and temperature. Damage to one unit or tank often leads to a domino effect: pressure is broken, a fire occurs, the system is stopped in an emergency - and production is stopped.

With the military-industrial complex, everything is more complicated. This is a different type of facility - with a different structure, level of protection, and resistance to damage. It is much more difficult to achieve a noticeable result here.

Even during World War II, the USSR deliberately moved a large part of its defense enterprises as far away from the front as possible - deep in the rear. This laid the systemic logic: the production of critical weapons should be as protected as possible and far from a potential enemy.

For example, the manufacturer of the T-90M "Proryv" tanks and the modernized T-72 B3/T-72B1, Uralvagonzavod, is located in Nizhny Tagil, 1,700 km from the Russian-Ukrainian border.

Now, continuing the practice of the Soviet Union, a large ecosystem for the production of Shahed-type UAVs has been built in Tatarstan, approximately 1,200 km from the contact line, by the Alabuga SEZ.

To understand how difficult it is to hit such an object, even after flying to it, it is enough to analyze the master plan of the Uralvagonzavod workshops.

The plant is assembled like a scaly organism. Each critical process here has its own "island" - in the event of a fire, the flame is locked inside and does not spread further. The most expensive workshops - the sixth, tenth and eleventh assembly lines - are hidden in the middle of a "sandwich" of auxiliary buildings, so they still have to be reached.

Energy and transport arteries are duplicated: at least two boiler houses and three parallel mains - even if one branch "goes down", the rest pick up the load. The walls between the buildings act as concrete filters: an explosion in the adjacent span is cut off by a firewall, and the lines on both sides continue to turn the conveyor.

And finally, there is a buffer of logistics and administrative buildings along the perimeter; they take the first blow so that the "core" of the plant has time to isolate itself and continue working. Thus, UVZ is not a fortress with a single drawbridge, but a whole system of locks: knocking out one does not mean flooding all.

For clarity, let's analyze it by department:

How are factories protected?

But to at least try to destroy such an object, you must first fly to it.

Classic air defense along the route is no longer the only shield for the Russians. More and more often we see that critical facilities, especially those related to the military-industrial complex, are being protected directly on their territory. We are talking about placing anti-aircraft missile systems directly at factories - as a rule, this is the Pantsir air defense system, which has proven to be one of the most effective means against Ukrainian drones.

To increase the visibility and firing sector, the complexes are installed on special embankments or towers. Satellite images clearly show these sites - for example, on the territory of the Alabuga Special Economic Zone, where the Shahed production is based; a separate Pantsir is located in the Kuzmino Gat settlement right among residential buildings - it covers the Tambov gunpowder plant. Another example is the air defense tower on the territory of military unit 3058, or a fortified embankment near the Ya.M. Sverdlov plant, where two new complexes have recently appeared.

Placing air defense systems in residential areas is a common practice. One recent example is the city of Zelenograd, where after the intensification of air defense work, fragments of TKB-1055 "Gvozd" missiles, which are used by the Pantsir air defense system, were found on the streets. This once again confirms that the systems are placed directly in city blocks.

Fragment of a Russian air defense missile on a city street PHOTO 7

One of the characteristic changes that has appeared in response to the mass use of strike UAVs is the installation of mesh structures not only above the roofs, but also around the entire perimeter of buildings. Sometimes this is not a classic metal mesh, but light screens made of another material, but the principle remains the same: to create a physical obstacle in the path of UAVs. For example, at the Sverdlov plant, such meshes were installed around the boiler room and production workshop.

At the first stages, such nets could partially dampen the kinetic energy of drones and reduce the likelihood of damage. But now they are losing their effectiveness due to modifications of our strike UAVs. Moreover, nets are increasingly playing the opposite role - unmasking workshops that play an important role in the functioning of the facility. One recent example is the strike on the Energia plant in the city of Yelets on the night of July 15. Despite the presence of net protection, the building was hit.

Interestingly, Russia is beginning to adopt Ukrainian tactics to counter UAVs. In particular, in some areas the enemy is introducing mobile fire groups - similar to those used by the Ukrainian Defense Forces. In addition, some enterprises are recruiting volunteers to create crews of anti-aircraft FPV drones, which are supposed to shoot down Ukrainian strike UAVs right near the facilities.

So, unlike energy facilities, most Russian military-industrial complex enterprises have a systemic defense architecture that has been formed since Soviet times - from rear deployment to deeply thought-out internal logistics and structural segmentation. The plants were designed so that even in the event of an attack, critical processes could continue to work: workshops are duplicated, energy and transport have several independent branches, and firewall partitions minimize the risk of large-scale damage.

This historical foundation is being supplemented by modern means – for example, the placement of Pantsir air defense systems directly on the territory of facilities, as well as the installation of anti-drone nets around the perimeter of key buildings. In addition, Russia has begun to adopt Ukrainian approaches: it is introducing mobile fire groups to intercept drones and forming crews of anti-aircraft FPV drones at the enterprises themselves. This allows it to respond quickly to threats already at the final stage of the attack route.

However, these measures do not make the objects completely inaccessible - they only change the nature of the tasks. And to find vulnerabilities in such a system, one has to carefully study not only the general architecture, but also specific technological and logistical nodes.

New challenges for Ukrainian deepstrikers

The success of deep strikes depends not only on the technical characteristics of the UAV. The result is influenced by: tactics of use, quality of reconnaissance and targeting, level of operator training, weather conditions, time of day, seasonal factors, etc.

Now we are witnessing an expansion of the arsenal of strike UAVs not only in types, but also in functionality: from explosive weight to speed and range. If earlier the focus was on the conditionally "universal" AN-196 "Fever" and the smaller "Bober", now new products are appearing on the scene. For example, the FP-1 is a UAV that recently successfully hit the Krasnozavodsk chemical plant.

In addition to classic propeller models, a segment of jet drones is developing, which are closer in nature to cruise missiles. These include, in particular, "Hell" and "Palyanytsia". These products have turbojet engines, which allows them to reach speeds of over 600 km/h and makes interception difficult. Their use is less media-driven, but photos of debris at impact sites periodically appear.

In parallel, already known models are being modified. For example, the chassis of the "Feb" has been removed - probably to reduce drag, free up space for additional fuel or an enlarged warhead. Launches began to be carried out not from the airfield, but from field mobile platforms, which allows minimizing risks for the crew.

In addition to the technical evolution of the products themselves, Ukraine is also improving tactical approaches to the use of strike UAVs. It is worth remembering: the fact of shooting down a drone does not mean that the operation was unsuccessful. In many cases, this is part of the overall plan.

Now, the use of decoys, i.e. cheap UAVs that simulate an attack to distract air defenses, is increasingly being recorded. The tactic of "frontal strike" is also practiced: one or more combat drones deliberately enter an area where air defenses are known to be present in order to force them to open fire. At this time, the main strike group enters from the flanks or bypasses - and thus successfully reaches the target.

Another element of modern tactics is the use of jet-powered UAVs. Due to their high speed, they are often perceived by the enemy as cruise missiles, making them a priority target for air defense. Meanwhile, slower, but more powerful UAVs infiltrate the target from another direction.

Over the past two and a half years, Ukrainian deep strikes have evolved from "just flying into the rear" to "point hits that stop production." The first stage was marked by strikes on the energy sector, where a single wave of explosions could paralyze the entire technological chain. The second stage is more complex - attacks on the military-industrial complex: on dispersed, duplicated and multi-level protected enterprises.

Ukraine plans to produce about 30,000 strike UAVs in 2025. At the same time, Russia, according to the State Defense Committee, has at least twice as many. This difference in the potential number of drones once again reminds us that Ukraine should not compete for resources, but seek technological asymmetric responses to threats and look for weaknesses.

But even when the drone doesn't destroy the target, the operation still has a multi-layered effect.

Psychological: after unexpected attack attempts, there have been cases where some Russian military facilities have reduced their activity, and civilians are beginning to understand that there is no "safe rear" and the war is not somewhere in Ukraine, but is already reaching their cities.

Financial: Each attack forces the Kremlin to spend hundreds of millions of dollars on air defense missiles, embankments, anti-drone nets, and logistics restructuring. And that's not counting the "dummy" attacks that have forced Russia to constantly implement the "Carpet" plan at major aviation hubs, resulting in billions in losses for airlines and airports.

Military: Air defense forces are being pulled back, which opens corridors for other strikes.

Preventive: in the event of escalation, you can immediately return to the good old energy strikes.

That is why it is incorrect to assess the effectiveness of deep strikes only through "cotton" videos or comparisons with unsuccessful cases. A comprehensive analysis is needed that compares costs (the cost of long-range drones is constantly changing) with all visible and indirect results. And only in this way can we say whether Ukrainian long-range drones are fulfilling their mission or have lost their relevance.