Two months of strikes on Russia's energy sector. Is Ukraine succeeding in "shutting down" the Russian oil industry?

All last summer and spring, Ukraine barely hit Russian energy – either because of Trump's attempt to end the war or because of the semi-mythical "energy truce." Then the focus of the strikes shifted to defense plants.

From March 20 to June 30, 2025, using open sources and satellite imagery, the OSINT community CyberBoroshno recorded 19 successful hits on defense plants, 5 on military facilities, and none on energy.

At the same time, the effect of strikes on factories was quite limited. Sometimes Ukrainian long-range weapons delivered successful strikes on weapons production, but without a large number of weapons with a large warhead, it was impossible to inflict decisive damage on the Russian defense industry.

Ukraine has long demonstrated restraint to the world and adhered to agreements, refraining from strikes on energy infrastructure. However, after Russia's continuous attacks on our energy sector and the killing of our people, unilateral restraint has lost its meaning, and our drone operators have returned to strikes on the enemy's energy facilities.

According to President Zelensky, Ukraine is already capable of launching 100-150 drones per day into Russia. This is several times less than the enemy, but it is already giving tangible results, which we see in the media almost every day.

CyberBoroshno analyzed the latest attacks on the Russian energy sector specifically for Defense.

Where do our drones hit?

To start with, some numbers. CyberBoroshno analyzes only those hits that are confirmed by video from the scene or satellite images. In total, there were about 50 reported strikes, but some of them were not included in the analysis because they have no confirmation, except for textual mentions in the media.

So, in August-September 2025, 30 attacks on energy facilities in the Russian Federation were confirmed. Of these, 23 were successful, 2 were unsuccessful, and 5 were unknown.

That is, the Defense Forces carried out 3 successful confirmed hits per week. For comparison, in January-March 2025, when Ukraine also struck Russian oil facilities, there were 2.1 successful hits on the energy sector per week.

That is, Ukraine not only did not lose momentum in striking the enemy's energy sector, but was also able to increase it, at least for a moment, compared to the previous campaign.

This is due not only to the actual success of Ukrainian attacks, but also to their concentration in a certain period of time and a greater focus on energy infrastructure, rather than warehouses, logistics, and defense plants.

All recorded successful and unsuccessful lesions are summarized in the table below.

The strikes on Russia's oil refining infrastructure have a clear and consistent logic. Importantly, many of the strikes now target critical equipment, not tankers, as in the previous campaign.

It also seems that the dominant Ukrainian means of destruction, at least according to published videos, has become the FP-1 drone from the Firepoint company. The legendary Lyutyis also continue to fly, but they are now seen less.

The largest number of confirmed successful hits (9) are on atmospheric-vacuum tubular units. These are the basic units of primary oil processing, and their damage effectively paralyzes the operation of the refinery, reducing or even completely stopping the production of petroleum products.

The second place in terms of the number of successful attacks (5) is occupied by technological overpasses. Four of them were recorded directly at the refinery and one more at the oil pumping stations (OPS). These are extremely vulnerable points of internal communications: oil and products are transported between installations through them. Any damage leads to blocking of work even in those areas that were not directly damaged.

In third place in terms of the number of hits (4) are gas fractionation and gas and condensate processing plants. Their role is strategic, as they ensure the production of liquefied gas and petrochemicals, which is critically important not only for domestic consumption, but also for export. Hitting these nodes directly reduces Russia's ability to support the liquefied petroleum gas market and the stable operation of the petrochemical industry.

Apart from the strikes on the oil refinery, there were strikes on the linear production dispatching and oil pumping stations. 5 confirmed hits fall on them. These are key elements of the main oil pipelines, and their damage can stop the supply of raw materials for hundreds of kilometers, creating serious problems for both domestic logistics and export flows.

But, as already mentioned above, not all attacks are successful. To soberly assess their effectiveness, it is worth conducting a high-quality After Action Review — an analysis of the results of each attack. And a beautiful picture in the media does not always mean painful defeats for the enemy.

For example, consider the Ukhta Refinery. The media reported something like: "Explosions and sirens were heard in the city of Ukhta. According to preliminary information, the Ukhta Refinery was hit. Local media outlets are reporting a hole in the tank and a fire after a drone attack."

However, there was no actual confirmation of a fire or critical damage. The only thing the media published was a photo of a hole in the tank, which never caught fire.

Another example — the media reported that the Saratov refinery was hit, and there was even a video of the explosion. But later it turned out that the drone had hit a nearby lake.

Even successful operations do not guarantee results. For example, the damage to infrastructure related to the Druzhba oil pipeline only suspended the supply of Russian fuel to Hungary for a few days, until Russia found a way to restore operations.

It is important to consider such attacks not only in terms of the range of the flight or the fact of the hit, but primarily in terms of the duration of the production shutdown, supply disruptions, and the real impact on the system. "Flying 1,700 km" in itself cannot be considered a success.

The game continues.

Many hits have proven effective and led to disruptions in production and logistics, but it is too early to draw conclusions.

To turn these individual successes into a sustainable strategic outcome requires a systematic approach: consistent verification of each case and parallel increase in the capacity, accuracy, and consistency of strikes. It is equally important to coordinate actions with diplomatic and economic steps to maximize pressure on the enemy.

But what can we say now? The fuel shortage in the consumer market has already become a problem of all-Russian scale. We analyzed Russian open sources and recorded reports of fuel problems in 33 of the 83 subjects of the Russian Federation. We have marked them on the map for illustrative purposes.

Ekonomichna Pravda wrote that the attacks on the oil refineries are taking place at the peak of fuel consumption. So we can say that the Defense Forces chose a very good time to conduct the strike campaign.

At the same time, it would be naive to believe that the fuel situation will somehow affect the availability of diesel in the enemy army. Clearly, Russian tanks will be refueled as a priority, and civilians and exporters will feel the shortage.

But this is a good way to exert economic pressure, because oil and oil products account for about 30% of the Russian budget's revenues, with which they buy weapons and pay their army of mercenaries.

It takes some time to accurately calculate the percentage of "knocked out" oil refining. And here it is easy to mislead yourself, because at the beginning of 2024, there were reports in the media that Ukraine "instantly" knocked out 14% of Russian oil refining.

And by the end of 2024, it turned out that the Russian Federation had restored some of the plants and increased processing at the surviving facilities, so the annual decline in oil refining was 3%. This is also a result, but it looks much more modest.

Now, during the new campaign, different publications are citing different figures and conflicting opinions. For example, the Russian publication RBC reported that 38% of the refinery's capacity was idled, two-thirds of which were due to Ukrainian strikes. Kommersant reported a 20% fuel shortage and a 1 million ton production reduction in September.

How much is it advisable to trust the Russian media in such a situation? And if it is true, how long will this result last? All this will become known for sure later, when it will be possible to compare revenue figures and establish a clear cause-and-effect relationship with the strikes on energy infrastructure.

Meanwhile, the Ukrainian campaign continues, and it is still too early to sum up.