New recipe against the Shaheds. Why should Ukraine develop drone air defense?

Shaheds are becoming more and more numerous, and this worries Ukrainians. If a year ago they were launched in hundreds per month, now they are launched in thousands. Also, a lot of damage is caused by Russian reconnaissance drones, which often fly into the rear in broad daylight and launch ballistic missiles.

"They have greatly scaled up the production of Shahed and are still scaling it up. If we don't start acting right now, our infrastructure, production, and defense facilities will be destroyed," wrote Serhii "Flash" Beskrestnov, a specialist in the field of military radio technologies, in his blog.

Reliance on allies is becoming less and less reliable. In June, the US transferred 20,000 air defense missiles to the Middle East, which were intended for Ukraine - it was on them that the military hoped to combat Russian drones.

To survive, Ukraine is forced to quickly find and scale up its own production capabilities. And such a tool exists – an interceptor drone.

Last year, FPV drones began destroying slow Russian reconnaissance drones like Orlan, Zala, Supercam, and others. For this purpose, the military and engineers slightly modified conventional FPV drones, equipped units with small radars to see the target, and worked out the tactics of destruction.

Now, interceptor drones are already starting to hit the much faster Shaheds, and specialized aircraft-type drones are appearing on the market, specifically designed to shoot down air targets. The Kyiv Regional State Administration reported that during one of the recent night attacks, the Clear Sky Unmanned Systems Forces unit destroyed 33 enemy UAVs with drones at once.

President Zelensky recently publicly mentioned interceptor drones, inviting funding from allies. This clearly marks the technology as strategic for Ukraine.

The army owes much of the proliferation of interceptor drones to charitable foundations. Currently, this direction is actively being developed by the Serhiy Prytula, Serhiy Sternenko, and "Return Alive" foundations.

The Dronefall project from Come Back Alive began last year as a fundraiser to shoot down reconnaissance UAVs. Thanks to donations from businesses and citizens, the foundation has managed to build an infrastructure to destroy over 2,000 Russian UAVs worth about $150 million. It is now gradually moving on to destroying Shaheds.

Taras Tymochko, a consultant from Come Back Alive tells Defense about the development of Ukrainian technologies for interceptor drones, specialized radars, methods of countering the Russians, and the limitless space for scaling.

"Each subsequent drone is cheaper to shoot down than the previous one"

You often hear that drone air defense is when a $500 drone shoots down a $50,000 reconnaissance drone. In my opinion, this is a very simplified picture, because the military still needs a lot of expensive infrastructure: transportation, communications, generators, equipment, operator training, etc. Have you calculated how much it actually costs to shoot down one aerial target with an FPV drone?

We always have a discussion about this among our colleagues. If we take the value of all the property that we transferred to the units and divide it by the number of drones shot down, then as of now it comes out to 245 thousand hryvnias for one enemy reconnaissance drone.

But this is an extremely rough calculation. Because for the first downed drone you need to invest a lot of money in infrastructure development, and for the hundredth – many times less.

The price of one enemy drone shot down decreases over time as operators gain experience. A soldier may spend ten drones on his first shootdown, but as he begins to understand the technical nuances of his equipment and gains skills, the number of attempts per target decreases significantly, and the cost of the operation accordingly.

But the Russians are also adapting to our drone air defense and inventing different ways to counter it. As of now, is the effectiveness of the attack increasing or is it already starting to fall?

The return on our investment is growing. If we go back to our rough calculations, in the fall we spent an average of 300 thousand UAH per drone, and in the spring - already 245 thousand.

And it should be taken into account that we are deliberately involving less experienced units in the project more and more. This means that at the moment we are investing more money in shooting down their first drones. But thanks to the already experienced units, the average cost per Russian drone is gradually decreasing.

So each subsequent drone is cheaper than the previous one?

That's right.

What do you lack most to shoot down more Russian drones: money or people?

The most difficult part of this project right now is training people. We have a very limited number of training centers that train pilots for interceptor drones, and we have to look for alternatives. For example, I often ask units with a lot of experience to take on less experienced units for internships.

As practice shows, this training is faster than usual. But there is another side. The unit that should be spending its time and effort on interception is spending time on training its adjuncts.

"The queue for Ukrainian radar stations is 13 months"

One of the key elements of drone air defense is small radar stations (RAS), which are able to see the position of the target and its altitude. This equipment is imported and quite complex. Is it enough to continue to increase the number of interceptor groups?

The enemy is actively hunting for our radar stations. Sometimes he succeeds, sometimes he doesn't, because we have already started to counteract this. But now there are no problems with the presence of these radars.

Are there already similar radars of Ukrainian design? To what extent do they meet the needs of interceptor drone operators?

There is a very large demand for Ukrainian radar stations now. The military is very praising them. The queue to receive a model from one domestic factory is already 13 months. Just six months ago, the queue was 6 months. That is, our manufacturer lacks scalability. Demand is growing, but production capacity is not keeping up.

Ukrainian technology is simpler and more stable to use by interceptor operators because it is designed for the appropriate purposes. Imported technology has many operating modes and settings for different purposes, which creates difficulties.

The Russians are coming up with various ways to evade our FPV drones. For example, they put a camera on the back of the drone and make a maneuver as soon as the interceptor drone appears in the lens. Can this tactic defeat "Dronefall"?

Russian rear view cameras still have a limited field of view. Accordingly, you can study how they use these cameras and enter from the blind spot. For example, if on the "Orlan" this camera is placed from below, then it means you have to enter from above. On the Zala the camera is from above, then it means you have to enter from below.

More often, the Russians put radio sensors on their drones that allow their operators to see our FPVs approaching. Then they start maneuvering, dodging, and trying to escape somewhere, and the camera lets them know how far away it is.

At first glance, such tactics can be used to counteract us, but we also have something to answer to this. This is a constant process of development. Moreover, such maneuvers are actually performed by their highly trained operators. Less experienced ones immediately dive during such maneuvers, the parachute is released and the drone is lost.

It's clear with the Russians. But how do we technically improve the shooting down on our side?

We are increasing the time in flight, especially with the advent of aircraft-type interceptors. Now it can be up to an hour, which allows for patrols. But in the case of pursuit, the maximum time will be less, because the engines will be operating at full power.

Ukrainian-made communication systems are getting better and better. Ukraine is very successful in this segment, and I think our companies have a great future after the war.

Also, there are increasingly frequent cases of using automated systems that help to establish visual contact with the target. This reduces the search time and the time in the air before hitting the target.

Is it realistic to make the shooting down system fully automated? So that target detection would work automatically and, at the signal of one operator at the computer, the drone would take off on its own, approach the target on its own, and hit it on its own?

This is quite possible, but it requires a lot of time and work. Such systems already exist, but they are in a disassembled state. That is, there is a separate automatic launch system, a separate targeting system, and a separate destruction system. Each of them is at a different stage of development, but there are already certain successful results of application.

But the problem is that these different "pieces" belong to different companies. If all this were combined into one mechanism, and if all these engineers worked together, then I think we would have had a drone with automatic launch and automatic target destruction a long time ago.

When you cook, you might have a vegetable cutter, but you still have to cook spaghetti by hand. But vegetables may not be the most difficult process in the kitchen. The same goes for drones. If you've flown a drone a thousand times, manually guiding it to its destination, then for you, this is not a difficult task that needs to be automated.

What if there are ten drones and only two operators near the facility?

There are communications developments that allow multiple drones to be controlled simultaneously. As of now, there is not a huge demand for such automated technology on the front lines.

Are there frequent cases of friendly fire from interceptor units? How do you counter them?

Such cases do happen, but with the development of technology and interceptor tactics, this number is decreasing. The only recipe is high-quality interaction with adjacent units and coordination of work in the lane.

"To shoot down the Shahed, additional training and more money are needed"

Has it already been possible to organize a mass shootdown by interceptor drones of the Shaheds and their imitators that are haunting Ukrainian cities?

Shaheds are shot down, and it has long been no secret. There are several different types of means that show a systematic result in this. That is, the same unit with the same drone and tactics manages to shoot down several Shaheds.

The problem is to scale all this up. To master "anti-Shahed" means, additional training and money are needed. Our foundation is already helping to intercept Shaheds.

And what is the difference between a drone for shooting down Shaheds and a drone that shoots down reconnaissance drones?

More speed, more warhead, and a few more features that are better left secret.

Many people ask, can drones shoot down cruise missiles? If, for example, they are equipped with a small jet engine?

No, that doesn't make sense. For example, when you fly up to the Shahed, it happens at a tremendous speed and you need to know at what moment to press the detonation button. And you need to make sure you don't make a mistake, because every second is a meter closer to the target.

Therefore, at the very high speeds at which cruise missiles fly, it would be optimal to automate the entire process based on a certain trigger – thermal or visual. And this is a full-fledged air defense missile.

Do you face bureaucratic obstacles to scale up your downsizing?

There are no obstacles within the Foundation's work. However, this project is already at the stage where it is worth thinking about joint work and coordination with government agencies to move to another qualitatively and quantitatively higher level. There is room for opportunity here.

Does Dronefall help in developing the technology or are you just scaling up the numbers and training?

We don't have our own R&D center or production. And we've never set such a goal. We can help others develop, but these are not our developments.

There are various companies that offer us their developments, especially in communication systems, in new engines, wing and fuselage shapes, if we are talking about FPV aircraft type. Sometimes we buy something for testing to support the manufacturer in the early stages of development, we help to refine the product by providing quality feedback from the division, and then the manufacturer develops the product itself according to market rules.

Sometimes we are offered some new solutions. For example, a communication module to limit the impact of enemy or friendly electronic warfare. We coordinate this with the units, and if they are interested, we test the new technology.

If you suddenly have an extra $10 million on Dronefall, what will you be able to do?

We would invest in training. We have a few training centers, but they are small, so we could scale them up. We would also invest in training "anti-Shahed" operators. We would help diversify the production of drones that are capable of intercepting Shaheds, we would push for the qualitative development of these means. Competition in the market would accelerate the development of technology.

The need for resources is enormous. We are still a long way from exhausting our institutional capacities or fully fulfilling all the tasks that lie ahead.

Now Dronefall is engaged in covering the line of combat contact. We are involved in the fight against Shaheds, but there is a huge field for work here. And an even bigger field for work is the covering of entire cities, the creation of a second echelon of "small air defense", which would cover the Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia and other cities.

Every citizen of Ukraine can help develop drone air defense right now by donating to Dronefall or any other similar initiative from volunteer funds. Collection from Come Back Alive at this link.